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EXTENDING THE NORMATIVITY OF THE
EXTENDED FAMILY: REFLECTIONS ON
MOORE V. CITY OF EAST CLEVELAND
Angela Onwuachi-Willig*
INTRODUCTION
For decades, legal scholars have praised1 Justice William Brennan’s
concurring opinion in Moore v. City of East Cleveland.2 Scholars have
applauded Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion for its acknowledgment of
the many family forms existing in society and its recognition of the ways in
which African American and immigrant family patterns have historically
differed from the nuclear family pattern that is so commonly found in white
suburban households.3
In many ways, such widespread admiration of Justice Brennan’s
concurrence is merited. Unlike Justice Lewis Powell’s plurality decision,
which does not mention race at all, Justice Brennan’s concurrence, joined

* Chancellor’s Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley School of Law. I give
my sincere thanks to Robin Lenhardt and Clare Huntington for having the vision to organize
the Fordham Law Review’s Family Law Symposium entitled Moore Kinship held at
Fordham University School of Law. For an overview of the symposium, see R.A. Lenhardt
& Clare Huntington, Foreword: Moore Kinship, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2551 (2017). Thanks
also to Dean Melissa Murray and the Haas Institute for an Inclusive and Fair Society for
their generous research support and to Mario Barnes, Catherine Smith, all participants in the
symposium for their feedback on this project, and Luke Ryan and the other editors of the
Fordham Law Review for their feedback on this project. Finally, I give special thanks to my
husband Jacob Willig-Onwuachi and our three children, Elijah, Bethany, and Solomon, for
their constant love and support.
1. See, e.g., Robin Morris Collin & Robert William Collin, Are the Poor Entitled to
Privacy?, 8 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 181, 213–14 (1991) (using Justice Brennan’s analysis
about African American families to show how zoning laws can become a powerful tool that
“exclude[s] poor families based not only on physical attributes of land use but also on more
nebulous attributes of the character of the community”).
2. 431 U.S. 494 (1977); id. at 506–13 (Brennan, J., concurring).
3. See Enid Trucios-Haynes, “Family Values” 1990’s Style: U.S. Immigration Reform
Proposals and the Abandonment of the Family, 36 BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 241, 245–46 (1998)
(relating Justice Brennan’s comments about the prevalence of extended families among
African Americans and his critiques about the disparate effects of East Cleveland’s
ordinance on African American families to constructions of families in the immigration
context); see also Angela Mae Kupenda, Two Parents Are Better Than None: Whether Two
Single, African American Adults—Who Are Not in a Traditional Marriage or a Romantic or
Sexual Relationship with Each Other—Should Be Allowed to Jointly Adopt and Co-Parent
African American Children, 35 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 703, 707–10 (1996) (praising and
using Justice Brennan’s analysis to argue for single-parent adoptions by African Americans).
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by Justice Thurgood Marshall, rejects this approach of colorblindness.4
Instead, the concurrence attempts to engage the many ways in which legal
and social constructions of family have been shaped by factors like race,
immigrant status, and socioeconomic class, as well as the means by which
purportedly neutral laws can have a negative, disparate effect on historically
marginalized groups such as African Americans.5
While Justice Brennan rejected the plurality’s colorblind approach, he
unintentionally fortified the hierarchy of family structures in society by
reinforcing an understanding of a common family form among African
Americans—the extended family—as deviant.
This Article briefly
examines and analyzes Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion in Moore as a
means of exposing how deeply embedded the notion of African American
familial deviance is in our society. Specifically, this Article argues that the
assumption of African American deviance in families is so strong that even
the U.S. Supreme Court’s two most progressive justices at that time—
Justices Brennan and Marshall—failed to acknowledge and appreciate the
inherent strengths of extended family forms when presented with an
opportunity to do so.6 Indeed, rather than explaining why extended family
forms are a model toward which all families can aspire, Justices Brennan
and Marshall instead reduced extended families to an option that should be
utilized only “in times of hardship” and “under the goad of brutal economic
necessity.”7 Additionally, Justices Brennan and Marshall failed to advance
judicial understandings about the complexities of racism when they chose
not to explore and analyze the intraracial dynamics involved in East
Cleveland’s regulation of families. Such an exploration would have added
a vital layer of understanding about the operation and practice of racism in
contemporary society by exposing how internalized racism creates
incentives for more-privileged African Americans to discriminate against
less-privileged African Americans, precisely because more-privileged
African Americans wish to distance themselves from negative stereotypes
and perceptions that are associated with being black.
Part I of this Article briefly recounts the plurality decision in Moore
before analyzing Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion and detailing how
the concurrence affirms, rather than deconstructs, the notion of African
American deviance in families. Next, Part II specifies the ways in which
Justice Brennan could have truly uplifted African American families and
other families of color by identifying and explicating the strengths of
extended or multigenerational family forms among people of color and by
showing how such family forms can be a model, or even the model (if one
must be chosen), for all families. Then, Part III concludes by enumerating
4. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 509–10 (Brennan, J., concurring). See generally Ian
Haney-López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779 (2012) (offering a critique of
colorblindness in legal doctrine).
5. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 509–10 (Brennan, J., concurring).
6. PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS,
AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 47 (2d ed. 2000) (“In general, everything the imagined
traditional family ideal is thought to be, African-American families are not.”).
7. Moore, 431 U.S. at 508 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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how Justice Brennan missed a key opportunity to explore and expose the
intricacies and complications of both race and racial discrimination when he
chose not to address the intraracial dynamics involved in the case. After all,
the City of East Cleveland that targeted and prosecuted Inez Moore, the
African American plaintiff in the case, was a majority-African-American
city with an African American City Manager and African American City
Commission.8 Such an exploration of the case’s intraracial undercurrents
not only could have disrupted societal understandings of the nuclear family
as the normative ideal but also would have laid bare the pressures that
African Americans have faced, both in history and at that time, to conform
to the nuclear family structure. Further, it would have revealed the
internalization of myths about African American familial deviance by the
black middle class in East Cleveland and would have shown the damaging
consequences of such pressures and internalization.
I. REDRAWING THE BOUNDARIES OF FAMILY:
THE DECISIONS IN MOORE V. CITY OF EAST CLEVELAND
In Moore, the Supreme Court issued an important plurality decision in
support of the principle of family autonomy when it held that an East
Cleveland housing ordinance, which limited occupancy of a dwelling unit
to members of one single family, violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.9 The plaintiff in the case was Mrs. Inez Moore, an
African American grandmother who was living together with her son, Dale
Moore Sr.; Dale’s son and her grandson, Dale Moore Jr.; and another
grandson, John Moore Jr., whose mother, the daughter of Inez Moore, had
passed away when John Jr. was a baby.10
In early 1973, the City of East Cleveland sent Inez Moore a notice
informing her that her grandson John Jr. was an illegal occupant of her
home according to section 1351.02 of the municipality’s Housing Code and
ordering her to comply with the section by permanently removing John Jr.
from her home.11 Because Inez Moore refused to remove her grandson
John Jr.—a child who had already experienced significant loss with the
death of his mother—from the safety of her home, the City filed criminal
charges against her and prosecuted the case.12 Inez Moore moved to
dismiss the charge on the ground that section 1351.02 was
unconstitutional.13 However, she lost her motion and was criminally
convicted, sentenced to five days’ imprisonment and forced to pay a $25
fine.14

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

See id. at 537 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
See id. at 496 (plurality opinion).
See id. at 496–97.
See id. at 497.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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After Inez Moore had exhausted all appeals, the Supreme Court granted
Analyzing Moore’s due process claim, the Court
certiorari.15
acknowledged that it “has long recognized that freedom of personal choice
in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,”16 and it asserted that
there is a “private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.”17
Noting that the “family is not beyond regulation,” the Court closely
examined the applicable East Cleveland housing ordinance to determine
whether its “intru[sion] on choices concerning family living arrangements”
was required to serve the city’s stated motivations behind the statute:
“preventing overcrowding, minimizing traffic and parking congestion, and
avoiding an undue financial burden on East Cleveland’s school system.”18
Ultimately, the Court concluded that the invasive nature of the statute was
not narrowly tailored to serve the purposes identified by the state, as the
statute’s impact was both underinclusive and overinclusive.19 The Court
explicated:
[T]he ordinance permits any family consisting only of husband, wife, and
unmarried children to live together, even if the family contains a half
dozen licensed drivers, each with his or her own car. At the same time it
forbids an adult brother and sister to share a household, even if both
faithfully use public transportation. The ordinance would permit a
grandmother to live with a single dependent son and children, even if his
school-age children number a dozen, yet it forces Mrs. Moore to find
another dwelling for her grandson John, simply because of the presence of
his uncle and cousin in the same household. We need not labor the
point.20

In so doing, the Court made a point of distinguishing Moore from Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas,21 where the Court held that the township had not
violated the due process rights of the plaintiffs, a group of unrelated college
students who lived together in one dwelling, by having and enforcing a
statute that prevented groups of more than two unrelated individuals from
occupying one-family units.22 Belle Terre, the Court asserted, did not
control the decision in Moore because the “ordinance there affected only
unrelated individuals” and “expressly allowed all who were related by
‘blood, adoption, or marriage’ to live together.”23 By contrast, the East
Cleveland ordinance was “slicing deeply into the family itself,” so deeply in

15. See id. at 498.
16. Id. at 499 (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40
(1979)).
17. Id. (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
18. Id. at 499–500.
19. See id.
20. Id. at 500.
21. 416 U.S. 1 (1973).
22. See id. at 6–9 (upholding an ordinance imposing limits on the types of groups that
could occupy a single dwelling unit).
23. Moore, 431 U.S. at 498.
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fact that it made it “a crime [for] a grandmother[] . . . to live with her
grandson in circumstances like those presented here.”24
The Court went on to explain its rejection of the city’s contention that
“any constitutional right to live together as a family extends only to the
nuclear family.”25 Specifically, the Court asserted that despite the “risks
[involved] when the judicial branch gives enhanced protection to certain
substantive liberties without the guidance of . . . the Bill of Rights,” history
made it clear that protection was required in this instance, for there was a
rich tradition “of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing
a household along with parents and children” in the United States.26
Ultimately, the Court, while citing to Pierce v. Society of Sisters,27 declared
that neither East Cleveland nor any other municipality could force “all to
live in certain narrowly defined family patterns,” particularly because many
close relatives “come together for mutual sustenance” in “times of
adversity.”28
Two of the Justices in the plurality, Justices William Brennan and John
Paul Stevens, each authored concurring opinions. Justice Brennan’s
concurrence became the subject of longstanding praise in legal academia
because it acknowledged how notions of family can be raced and classed.29
In that opinion, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Thurgood Marshall,
criticized East Cleveland for adopting a statute that identified the nuclear
family, “the pattern [of family] so often found in much of white suburbia,”
as the primary, if not the only, family form that should be promoted within
its boundaries.30 Without mentioning that Inez Moore, her son, and her
grandsons are African American, Justice Brennan detailed how East
Cleveland’s housing ordinance was likely to have a disproportionate impact
on African American families because extended and nonnuclear families
are more common among African American citizens than white citizens.31
In so doing, Justice Brennan offered comparative statistics on white and
black families, noting that “13% of black families compared with 3% of
white families include[d] relatives under 18 years old, in addition to the
couple’s own children” and that “48% of . . . black households” that are
headed by “an elderly woman,” as compared to only “10% of counterpart
white households, include related minor children not offspring of the head

24. Id. at 498–99.
25. Id. at 500.
26. Id. at 502–04 (noting that “the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family
precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition” and that history counseled against “cutting off any protection of family rights at
the . . . arbitrary boundary . . . of the nuclear family”).
27. 268 U.S. 510 (1925); id. at 534–35 (holding state compulsory education law
requiring students to attend solely public schools “unreasonably interferes with the liberty of
parents . . . to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control”).
28. Moore, 431 U.S. at 505–06.
29. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
30. Moore, 431 U.S. at 508 (Brennan, J., concurring).
31. See id. at 508–09.
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of household.”32 More so, Justice Brennan argued, the ordinance was
troubling because it intensified the economic burdens of families who were
struggling financially and working hard to survive “under the goad of brutal
economic necessity.”33 These nonnuclear families, Justice Brennan
proclaimed, were regularly formed as “a means of survival[] for large
numbers of the poor and deprived minorities of our society,” as
demonstrated by the family forms utilized by the “successive waves of
[white] immigrants who populated our cities” and had “been victims of
economic and other disadvantages that would [have] worsen[ed]” had they
been “compelled to abandon extended, for nuclear, living patterns.”34
Despite his recognition of the manner in which families can be and are
raced and classed, Justice Brennan indicated that he did not believe the East
Cleveland ordinance was racially motivated.35 Indeed, he proclaimed that
“[t]he record of this case would not support that implication” (though he
provided no explanation for this conclusion).36 Still, Justice Brennan noted
that he was concerned about disparate effects because, “in prohibiting [the
nonnuclear, extended] pattern of family living as a means of achieving its
objectives, appellee city ha[d] chosen a device that deeply intrude[d] into
family associational rights that historically have been central, and today
remain central, to a large proportion of our population.”37
Only in Justice Potter Stewart’s dissent did it become clear why Justice
Brennan was reluctant to believe that East Cleveland’s enforcement was
motivated by a racially discriminatory intent. In that dissent, Justice
Stewart revealed how a number of the decision makers in East Cleveland
shared the racial background of Inez Moore, writing:
I fail to understand why it follows that the residents of East Cleveland are
constitutionally prevented from following what Mr. Justice Brennan calls
the “pattern” of “white suburbia,” even though that choice may reflect
“cultural myopia.” In point of fact, East Cleveland is a predominantly
Negro community, with a Negro City Manager and City Commission.38

In essence, Justice Stewart’s concurrence exposed both his and Justice
Brennan’s mistaken assumption that somehow African Americans were
incapable of discriminating against other African Americans—here, that

32. Id. at 509–10; see also Solangel Maldonado, When Father (or Mother) Doesn’t
Know Best: Quasi-Parents and Parental Deference After Troxel v. Granville, 88 IOWA L.
REV. 865, 901–10 (2003) (detailing how the prevalence of multigenerational families among
African Americans and Latinos is not simply due to economic concerns but also cultural
values and norms about closeness to family). Additionally, in her book Failure to Flourish:
How Law Undermines Family Relationships, Clare Huntington highlights how “[m]ore than
51 million families now live in multigenerational homes.” CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO
FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS 99 (2014).
33. Moore, 431 U.S. at 508 (Brennan, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 508–09.
35. See id. at 510.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 537 n.7 (Stewart, J., dissenting).

2017]

EXTENDING THE EXTENDED FAMILY

2661

Inez Moore could not be the victim of racial discrimination, because the
alleged perpetrators were African American.
II. REIFYING OR CHALLENGING
THE NOTION OF THE NUCLEAR FAMILY
AS THE NORMATIVE IDEAL?
To be sure, Justice Brennan should be commended for his willingness to
recognize the role that race has played in constructing families as well as
family law. It is important to acknowledge, however, that even Justice
Brennan’s attempt to champion African American families reified notions
of black families as deviant. Although Justice Brennan’s concurring
opinion highlighted how facially neutral statutes like East Cleveland’s
section 1351.02 could “intrude” on African American families in ways that
are exclusionary39 and expressed the centrality of extended family units for
African American families and white immigrant families in the past, it also
reinforced the notion of the nuclear family as the ideal for American
families, an ideal that should be pursued in all communities unless the
families were facing challenging financial and social circumstances.40 As
Justice Brennan explained, he saw the prevalence of “the ‘extended’
form . . . among black families” as a reflection of “the truism that black
citizens, like generations of white immigrants before them, have been
victims of economic and other disadvantages.”41 Indeed, it was not the way
that the East Cleveland housing ordinance placed nuclear families at the
center that Justice Brennan found troubling but rather the way that the
ordinance “display[ed] a depressing insensitivity toward the economic and
emotional needs of a very large part of society.”42 Similarly, when Justice
Brennan spoke of the role that extended families had played “for successive
waves of immigrants who populated our cities,” he did so in a way that
implied that such immigrant families quickly and rightfully left behind
those purported “nonideal” family forms once they had climbed out of their
economically depressed situations.43
Additionally, rather than detail the many strengths of extended or
multigenerational family forms as a general matter or express how such
family forms can be a strong model of the kind of support and love that all
family members should provide for each other, Justice Brennan authored
his concurrence with a presumption that families turned to the support that
extended families can provide only “in times of hardship” and “under the
goad of brutal economic necessity.”44 For economically struggling
families, he wrote, “compelled pooling of scant resources require[d]
compelled sharing of a household.”45
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See id. at 510 (Brennan, J., concurring).
See id.
Id. at 509.
Id. at 507–08.
Id. at 508.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
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That Justices Brennan and Marshall, two progressive jurists with strong
records of upholding the rights of subordinated citizens, including African
Americans, would presume the deviance of prevalent family forms in black
communities is not surprising given the historical demonization of black
families by politicians and policymakers, many of whom were also well
intentioned.46 For example, in 1965, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a
liberal politician, articulated a narrative about black female-headed
households as the source of the destruction and dysfunction of African
American families that plagued the black community in U.S. society.47
Referring to black female-headed households as a “tangle of pathology,”48
Senator Moynihan blamed black mothers—not past and present racism or
other structural impediments that make it difficult to climb out of difficult
circumstances—for problems with drug use, poverty, and educational
disparities in the black community.49 He argued that the black family is
“the principal source of most of the aberrant, inadequate, or antisocial
behavior that [it] did not establish, but now serves to perpetuate.”50 Like
Senator Moynihan and other critics, Justice Brennan simply failed to
appreciate how extended families are great examples of the support
obligations and commitments that family members can satisfy for each
other.
III. EXPLORING AND EXPOSING THE COMPLEXITIES
OF RACE AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
In addition to failing to underscore the inherent value of
multigenerational families, both the majority and concurring Justices
missed out on an important opportunity to flesh out the complexities of
racial subordination when they failed to address the role that middle-class
African Americans, who constituted the majority of residents in East
Cleveland, played in reinforcing a racialized normative vision for families.
Specifically, the Justices failed to acknowledge and explain how the actions
of the black middle class in East Cleveland constituted a form of racism,
not just classism, against poor and working-class African Americans. Had
46. See, e.g., DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY:
THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION 29–46 (1965); Ann Cammett, Deadbeat Dads & Welfare
Queens: How Metaphor Shapes Poverty Law, 34 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 233 (2014).
47. MOYNIHAN, supra note 46, at 9–14; see also Ann Cammett, Welfare Queens Redux:
Criminalizing Black Mothers in the Age of Neoliberalism, 25 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 363,
391 (2016) (indicating that Senator Moynihan’s “report immediately provided the lynchpin
for successful efforts to defund the social safety net through welfare reform, and
conservative theorists continue to use it in order to give voice to victim-blaming theories of
poverty”); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Return of the Ring: Welfare Reform’s Marriage
Cure as the Revival of Post-Bellum Control, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1647, 1670 (2005) (“Senator
Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s 1965 governmental report reinforced race-based stereotypes in its
examination of the negative influence of illegitimacy and the lack of marriage on the black
family.”).
48. MOYNIHAN, supra note 46, at 29.
49. See id. at 29–46.
50. Id. at 30; see also Alycee Lane, “Hang Them If They Have to Be Hung”: Mitigation
Discourse, Black Families, and Racial Stereotypes, 12 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 171, 192 (2009).
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the Justices explored such intraracial complexities in Moore, they not only
could have revealed the pressures that African Americans have faced (both
in history and at that time) to conform to the nuclear family structure but
also could have revealed the internalization of myths about African
American familial deviance by the black middle class in East Cleveland that
has resulted in racial discrimination by African Americans against other
African Americans.
The first scholar to fully delve into the intraracial dynamics of the Moore
case was Robert Burt, who defended the city of East Cleveland’s ordinance
and criticized the majority and concurring opinions.51 As with Justice
Brennan, Burt viewed the nuclear family model as the ideal model for
which to strive.52 In Burt’s eyes, the real losers in Moore were blackmiddle-class families in East Cleveland.53 Viewing East Cleveland’s black
middle class as “socially and economically upwardly mobile” and seeing its
housing ordinance in section 1352.02 as an understandable effort by the
black middle class to distance itself from what he identified as “the ghetto
life-style,” Burt argued that the decision in Moore made it such that “the
nuclear families that had come together in East Cleveland could find
nowhere to remain together as a self-consciously contained community.”54
Burt, however, failed to understand that African Americans can also
discriminate against other African Americans. As numerous social
psychologists have shown in their research, African Americans can be just
as susceptible as other races to internalizing negative racial stereotypes
about African Americans as a group, developing implicit as well as
conscious biases against their own group and, more so, acting on those
negative implicit perceptions.55 No work illustrates this phenomenon better
than Professor Audrey McFarlane’s article “Operatively White?: Exploring
the Significance of Race and Class Through the Paradox of Black MiddleClassness.”56 McFarlane, a land use and economic development scholar,
has highlighted how the inclusion of middle-class blacks in middle-class
neighborhoods (even as they are experiencing white flight like East
Cleveland was) or gentrifying neighborhoods can obscure the racial nature
of problems in transitioning locations.57 Specifically, McFarlane explains
that “affluent Blacks sometimes demonstrate that they have similar
incentives to Whites—to avoid, run away from, or oppose projects or

51. See Robert A. Burt, The Constitution of the Family, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 329, 388–
91.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. Id. at 390; see also Frank I. Michelman, Super Liberal: Romance, Community, and
Tradition in William J. Brennan, Jr.’s Constitutional Thought, 77 VA. L. REV. 1261, 1323–
25 (1991).
55. See, e.g., Audrey G. McFarlane, Operatively White?: Exploring the Significance of
Race and Class Through the Paradox of Black Middle-Classness, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Fall 2009, 163; Brian A. Nosek et al., Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs from
a Demonstration Web Site, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS 101, 105 (2002).
56. See McFarlane, supra note 55.
57. See id. at 163–67.
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endeavors that would benefit lower-income Blacks”58—in part because
black middle-class neighborhoods are more likely to border poor
neighborhoods than white middle-class neighborhoods and are often
“communities with less retail, inferior services, [and] less commercial
services.”59 Thus, McFarlane notes, “[T]he black middle class are not as
successful at protecting their turf as [the] white middle class are.”60 In fact,
my own work explicates the practice of “distancing,” in which the most
racially palatable African Americans form their identities in ways that can
purposefully distinguish them from those African Americans viewed as
falling in line with negative racial stereotypes.61 Had Justice Brennan
directly challenged Justice Stewart’s dissenting contention that racism
could not be at play in Moore, because the majority of East Cleveland was
black, he would have articulated an understanding of the practice of racism
that could have helped guide the development of antidiscrimination
jurisprudence in other areas of law such as employment and housing
discrimination.
CONCLUSION
Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion in Moore illustrates the power of
negative stereotypes about and perceptions of black families. In American
society, the black family has long been demonized and painted as deviant
and dysfunctional—as the very root of social problems and inequities in the
black community. In a world where champions for racial justice like
Justices Brennan and Marshall are just as likely to operate under an
assumption of black deviance as those who have pathologized black
families, it is hard to imagine things changing at any point soon without
greater emphasis on and greater understanding of black families and racism
in all its complexities.

58. Id. at 165.
59. Id. at 187; Angela Onwuachi-Willig, For Whom Does the Bell Toll: The Bell Tolls
for Brown?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1507, 1526 (2005) (discussing how black middle-class
neighborhoods are more vulnerable to “poverty, higher crime, failing schools, and fewer
services than . . . white middle-class neighborhoods”); see also Sheryll D. Cashin, MiddleClass Black Suburbs and the State of Integration: A Post-Integrationist Vision for
Metropolitan America, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 729, 755–70 (2001) (same).
60. McFarlane, supra note 55, at 187.
61. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Volunteer Discrimination, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1895,
1898, 1921–26 (2007).

